Tag Archives: value

Noah Solomon: The Times they are A-Changin’

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Shutterstock/ Photo Contributuor PHLD Luca.

Come gather ’round people
Wherever you roam
And admit that the waters
Around you have grown
And accept it that soon
You’ll be drenched to the bone
If your time to you is worth savin’
And you better start swimmin’
Or you’ll sink like a stone
For the times they are a-changin’

  • Bob Dylan © Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC

By Noah Solomon

Special to Financial Independence Hub

In this month’s commentary, I will discuss both how and why the environment going forward will differ markedly from the one to which investors have grown accustomed. Importantly, I will explain the repercussions of this shift and the related implications for investment portfolios.

The Rear View Mirror: Where we’ve been

After being appointed Fed Chairman in 1979, Paul Volcker embarked on a vicious campaign to break the back of inflation, raising rates as high as 20%. His steely resolve ushered in a prolonged era of low inflation, declining rates, and the favourable investment environment that prevailed over the next four decades.

Importantly, there have been other forces at work that abetted this disinflationary, ultra-low-rate backdrop. In particular, the influence of China’s rapid industrialization and growth cannot be underestimated. Specifically, the integration of hundreds of millions of participants into the global pool of labour represents a colossally positive supply side shock that served to keep inflation at previously unthinkably well-tamed levels in the face of record low rates.

It’s all about Rates

The long-term effects of low inflation and declining rates on asset prices cannot be understated. According to Buffett:

“Interest rates power everything in the economic universe. They are like gravity in valuations. If interest rates are nothing, values can be almost infinite. If interest rates are extremely high, that’s a huge gravitational pull on values.”

On the earnings front, low rates make it easier for consumers to borrow money for purchases, thereby increasing companies’ sales volumes and revenues. They also enhance companies’ profitability by lowering their cost of capital and making it easier for them to invest in facilities, equipment, and inventory. Lastly, higher asset prices create a virtuous cycle: they cause a wealth effect where people feel richer and more willing to spend, thereby further spurring company profits and even higher asset prices.

Declining rates also exert a huge influence on valuations. The fair value of a company can be determined by calculating the present value of its future cash flows. As such, lower rates result in higher multiples, from elevated P/E ratios on stocks to higher multiples on operating income from real estate assets, etc.

The effects of the one-two punch of higher earnings and higher valuations unleashed by decades of falling rates cannot be overestimated. Stocks had an incredible four decade run, with the S&P 500 Index rising from a low of 102 in August 1982 to 4,796 by the beginning of 2022, producing a compound annual return of 10.3%. For private equity and other levered strategies, the macroeconomic backdrop has been particularly hospitable, resulting in windfall profits.

From Good to Great: The Special Case of Long-Duration Growth Assets

While low inflation and rates have been favourable for asset prices generally, they have provided rocket fuel for long-duration growth assets.

The anticipated future profits of growth stocks dwarf their current earnings. As such, investors in these companies must wait longer to receive future cash flows than those who purchase value stocks, whose profits are not nearly as back-end loaded.

All else being equal, growth companies become more attractive relative to value stocks when rates are low because the opportunity cost of not having capital parked in safe assets such as cash or high-quality bonds is low. Conversely, growth companies become less enticing vs. value stocks in higher rate regimes.

Example: The Effect of Higher Interest Rates on Value vs. Growth Companies

The earnings of the value company are the same every year. In contrast, those of the growth company are smaller at first and then increase over time.

  • With rates at 2%, the present value of both companies’ earnings over the next 10 years is identical at $89.83.
  • With rates at 5%, the present value of the value company’s earnings decreases to $69.91 while those of the growth company declines to $64.14.
  • With no change in the earnings of either company, an increase in rates from 2% to 5% causes the present value of the value company’s earnings to exceed that of its growth counterpart by 9%.

Losing an Illusion makes you Wiser than Finding a Truth

There are several features of the global landscape that will make it challenging for inflation to be as well-behaved as it has been in decades past. Rather, there are several reasons to suspect that inflation may normalize in the 3%-4% range and remain there for several years.

  • In response to rising geopolitical tensions and protectionism, many companies are investing in reshoring and nearshoring. This will exert upward pressure on costs, or at least stymie the forces that were central to the disinflationary trend of the past several decades.
  • The unfolding transition to more sustainable sources of energy has and will continue to stoke increased demand for green metals such as copper and other commodities.
  • ESG investing and the dearth of commodities-related capital expenditures over the past several years will constrain supply growth for the foreseeable future. The resulting supply crunch meets demand boom is likely to cause an acute shortage of natural resources, thereby exerting upward pressure on prices and inflation.
  • The world’s population has increased by approximately one billion since the global financial crisis. In India, there are roughly one billion people who do not have air conditioning. Roughly the same number of people in China do not have a car. As these countries continue to develop, their changing consumption patterns will stoke demand for natural resources, thereby exerting upward pressure on prices.
  • Labour unrest and strikes are on the rise. This trend will further contribute to upward pressure on wages and prices.

A Word about Debt

The U.S. government is amassing debt at an unsustainable rate, with spending up 10% on a year-over-year basis and a deficit running near $2 trillion. Following years of unsustainable debt growth (with no clear end in sight), the U.S. is either near or at the point where there are only four ways out of its debt trap:

  1. Raise taxes
  2. Cut spending/entitlements
  3. Default
  4. Stealth default (see below) Continue Reading…

Risk, Return & the Essence of Adding Value

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Image courtesy Outcome/Shutterstock

By Noah Solomon

Special to Financial Independence Hub

This month, I explore how the relationship between risk and return forms the bedrock of sound (or poor) investment results. I will also demonstrate why the management of these two elements constitutes the essence of adding or destroying value for investors. Lastly, (reader beware), I include a rant about investor complacency and the detrimental effects it can have on one’s wealth.

Good is Not the Enemy of Great: It is Great

David VanBenschoten was the head of the General Mills pension fund. In each of his 14 years in this role, the fund’s return had never ranked above the 27th percentile or below the 47th percentile.

Using simple math, one might assume that over the entire period the fund would have stood in the 37th percentile, which is the midpoint of its lowest and highest ranks. However, despite never knocking the lights out in any given year, VanBenschoten managed to achieve top-tier results over the entire period. By consistently attaining 2nd quartile performance in each and every year, over the 14-year period the fund achieved an enviable 4th percentile ranking.

The Hippocratic Oath and Investing

The seemingly irreconcilable difference between the average of VanBenschoten’s rankings and his overall rank over the whole 14-year period stems as much from the performance of other funds as from his own results.

To achieve outstanding performance, one must deviate from the crowd. However, doing so is a proverbial double-edged sword, as it can lead to vastly superior or inferior results. The preceding rankings indicate that most of the managers who were at the top of the pack in some years also had a commensurate tendency to be near the bottom in others, thereby tarnishing their overall rankings over the entire period.

In contrast, the General Mills pension fund, by being consistently warm rather than intermittently hot or cold, managed to outperform most of its peers. Managers who aim for top decile performance often end up shooting themselves in the foot. The moral of the story is that when it comes to producing superior results over the long term, consistently avoiding underperformance tends to be more important than occasionally achieving outperformance. In this vein, managers should take the physicians’ Hippocratic Oath and pledge to “first do no harm.”

Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: The Bright and Dark Sides of Asymmetry

The Latin term Sine Que Non describes an action that is essential and indispensable. In the world of investing, the ability to produce asymmetrical results meets this definition. It is the ultimate determinant of skill.

A manager who delivers twice the returns of their benchmark but has also experienced twice the volatility neither creates nor destroys value. They have simply robbed Peter (higher volatility) to pay Paul (commensurately higher returns). Since markets tend to go up over time, clients may marvel at the manager’s superior long-term returns. However, this does not change the fact that no value has been created – clients have merely paid in full for higher returns in the form of higher volatility.

If this same manager delivered 1.5 times the benchmark returns while experiencing twice the volatility, not only would they have failed to add value but would have destroyed it – they would have simply robbed Peter by exposing him to higher volatility while paying Paul less in the form of excess returns. In contrast, if the manager had produced twice the returns of the benchmark while experiencing only 1.5 times its volatility, then they deserve a firm pat on the back. They would have achieved asymmetrically positive results by paying Paul far more in outperformance than what they stole from Peter in higher volatility.

The Efficient Market Hypothesis: Why bother?

The efficient-market hypothesis (EMH) states that asset prices reflect all available information, causing securities to always be priced correctly and making markets efficient. By extension, the EMH asserts that you cannot achieve higher returns without assuming a commensurate amount of incremental risk, nor can you reduce risk without sacrificing a commensurate amount of return. It argues that it is impossible to consistently “beat the market” on a risk-adjusted basis. When applied to the decision to hire an active manager rather than a passive index fund, the EMH can be neatly summarized as “why bother?”

Continue Reading…

Value Investing: Looking beneath the surface

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Image from Outcome/QuoteInspector.com.

By Noah Solomon

Special to Financial Independence Hub

It goes without saying that 2022 was a less than stellar year for equity investors. The MSCI All Country World Index of stocks fell 18.4%. There was virtually nowhere to hide, with equities in nearly every country and region suffering significant losses. Canadian stocks were somewhat of a standout, with the TSX Composite Index falling only 5.8% for the year.

Looking below the surface, there was an interesting development underlying these broader market movements, with value stocks far outpacing their growth counterparts. Globally, value stocks suffered a loss of 7.5% as compared to a decline of 28.6% in growth stocks. This substantial outperformance was pervasive across countries and regions, including the U.S., Europe, Asia, and emerging markets. In the U.S., 2022’s outperformance of value stocks was the highest since the collapse of the tech bubble in 2000.

These historically outsized numbers have left investors wondering whether value’s outperformance has any legs left and/or whether they should now be tilting their portfolios in favor of a relative rebound in growth stocks. As the following missive demonstrates, value stocks are far more likely than not to continue outperforming.

Context is everything: Value is the “Dog” that finally has its Day

From a contextual perspective, 2022 followed an unprecedented period of value stock underperformance.

U.S Value vs. U.S. Growth Stocks – Rolling 3 Year Returns: 1982-2022

 

Although there have been (and will be) times when value stocks underperform their growth counterparts, the sheer scale of value’s underperformance in the several years preceding 2022 is almost without precedent in modern history. The extent of value vs. growth underperformance is matched only by that which occurred during growth stocks’ heyday in the internet bubble of the late 1990s.

Shades of Tech Bubble Insanity

The relative performance of growth vs. value stocks cannot be deemed either rational or irrational without analyzing their relative valuations. To the extent that the phenomenal winning streak of growth vs. value stocks in the runup to 2022 can be justified by commensurately superior earnings growth, it can be construed as rational. On the other hand, if the “rubber” of growth’s outperformance never met the “road” of superior profits, then at the very least you need to consider the possibility that crazy (i.e. greed, hope, etc.) had indeed entered the building.

The extreme valuations reached by many growth companies during the height of the pandemic bring to mind a warning that was issued by a market commentator during the tech bubble of the late 1990s, who stated that the prices of many stocks were “not only discounting the future, but also the hereafter.”

U.S. Value Stocks: Valuation Discount to U.S. Growth Stocks: (1995-2022)

 

Based on forward PE ratios, at the end of 2021 U.S. value stocks stood at a 56.3% discount to U.S. growth stocks. From a historical perspective, this discount is over double the average discount of 27.9% since 1995 and is matched only by the 56.6% discount near the height of the tech bubble in early 2000. This valuation anomaly was not just a U.S. phenomenon, with global value stocks hitting a 57.5% discount to global growth stocks, more than twice their average discount of 27.6% since 2002 and even larger than that which prevailed in early 2000 at the peak of the tech mania. Continue Reading…

All good things must come to an end: There by the grace of Paul Volcker went Asset Prices

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Image courtesy Creative Commons/Outcome

By Noah Solomon

Special to Financial Independence Hub

During the OPEC oil embargo of the early 1970s, the price of oil jumped from roughly $24 to almost $65 in less than a year, causing a spike in the cost of many goods and services and igniting runaway inflation.

At that time, the workforce was much more unionized, with many labour agreements containing cost of living wage adjustments which were triggered by rising inflation.

The resulting increases in workers’ wages spurred further inflation, which in turn caused additional wage increases and ultimately led to a wage-price spiral.The consumer price index, which stood at 3.2% in 1972, rose to 11.0% by 1974. It then receded to a range of 6%-9% for four years before rebounding to 13.5% in 1980.

Image New York Times/Outcome

After being appointed Fed Chairman in 1979, Paul Volcker embarked on a vicious campaign to break the back of inflation, raising rates as high as 20%. His steely resolve brought inflation down to 3.2% by the end of 1983, setting the stage for an extended period of low inflation and falling interest rates. The decline in rates was turbocharged during the global financial crisis and the Covid pandemic, which prompted the Fed to adopt extremely stimulative policies and usher in over a decade of ultra-low rates.

Importantly, Volcker’s take no prisoners approach was largely responsible for the low inflation, declining rate, and generally favourable investment environment that prevailed over the next four decades.

How declining Interest Rates affect Asset Prices: Let me count the ways

The long-term effects of low inflation and declining rates on asset prices cannot be understated. According to [Warren] Buffett:

“Interest rates power everything in the economic universe. They are like gravity in valuations. If interest rates are nothing, values can be almost infinite. If interest rates are extremely high, that’s a huge gravitational pull on values.”

On the earnings front, low rates make it easier for consumers to borrow money for purchases, thereby increasing companies’ sales volumes and revenues. They also enhance companies’ profitability by lowering their cost of capital and making it easier for them to invest in facilities, equipment, and inventory. Lastly, higher profits and asset prices create a virtuous cycle – they cause a wealth effect where people feel richer and more willing to spend, thereby further spurring company profits and even higher asset prices.

Declining rates also exert a huge influence on valuations. The fair value of a company can be determined by calculating the present value of its future cash flows. As such, lower rates result in higher multiples, from elevated P/E ratios on stocks to higher multiples on operating income from real estate assets, etc.

The effects of the one-two punch of higher earnings and higher valuations unleashed by decades of falling rates cannot be overestimated. Stocks had an incredible four decade run, with the S&P 500 Index rising from a low of 102 in August 1982 to 4,796 by the beginning of 2022, producing a compound annual return of 10.3%. For private equity and other levered strategies, the macroeconomic backdrop has been particularly hospitable, resulting in windfall profits.

It is with good reason and ample evidence that investing legend Marty Zweig concluded:

“In the stock market, as with horse racing, money makes the mare go. Monetary conditions exert an enormous influence on stock prices. Indeed, the monetary climate – primarily the trend in interest rates and Federal Reserve policy – is the dominant factor in determining the stock market’s major direction.”

To be sure, there are other factors that provided tailwinds for markets over the last 40 years. Advances in technology and productivity gains bolstered profit margins. Limited military conflict undoubtedly played its part. Increased globalization and China’s massive contributions to global productive capacity also contributed to a favourable investment climate. These influences notwithstanding, 40 years of declining interest rates and cheap money have likely been the single greatest driver of rising asset prices.

All Good things must come to an End

The low inflation which enabled central banks to maintain historically low rates and keep the liquidity taps flowing has reversed course. In early 2021, inflation exploded through the upper band of the Fed’s desired range, prompting it to begin raising rates and embark on one of the quickest rate-hiking cycles in history. Continue Reading…

Price, Value & the CAPE’d Crusade

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Image via Outcome/The Blue Diamond Gallery

By Noah Solomon

Special to the Financial Independence Hub

According to Warren Buffett, “Price is what you pay. Value is what you get.”

The cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio, commonly known as CAPE, is a valuation measure invented by Nobel Prize recipient Robert Shiller. It is calculated by taking the price of an index and dividing it by its average earnings over the past 10 years, adjusted for inflation. The ratio’s use of average earnings over the last decade helps to smooth out the impact of business cycles and other events and thus provides a better picture of a market’s sustainable earnings power.

The CAPE ratio is commonly used to gauge future returns over medium to long-term horizons. In theory, higher than average CAPE levels imply lower than average future returns, while their lower counterparts suggest that future returns will be relatively high.

In the following piece, I analyze historical data to determine if the CAPE ratio has been a useful predictor of future real (i.e., after inflation) returns. In my view, including real rather than nominal returns is appropriate given the recent resurgence of inflation. Investors must be mindful of inflation’s potential to erode a substantial portion of their portfolios’ purchasing power. Lastly, I comment on what investors can expect going forward given the current CAPE level.

The following table presents average real future returns following various CAPE ranges.

S&P 500 Index: Average Real Returns Sorted by CAPE Ratio (Jan. 1970 – Nov. 2022)

There has been an inverse relationship between CAPE ratios and future returns. When the CAPE ratio has been near the high end of its historical range, future returns have tended to be relatively low. Conversely, low CAPE ratios have tended to foreshadow higher returns. Whereas this relationship has not been statistically significant over shorter holding periods, it has been strong over the medium to long-term.

When CAPE ratios have been below their historical average of 21, annualized real returns over the subsequent five years have averaged 8.3%, as compared to only 3.3% when CAPE ratios have stood above this level. The corresponding numbers for 10 year holding periods have been 8.8% vs. 4.2%.

The difference in average returns cannot be understated. On a $10 million investment over 5 years, the difference in return equates to a real value of $14,922,900 vs. $11,754,768. Adding in the average inflation rate since 1970 of 4.04%, the corresponding nominal values have averaged $17,920,804 vs. $14,240,696.

Over ten-year holding periods, the average real values of a $10 million investment made when CAPE levels were below vs. above average were $23,290,712 and $15,137,096, respectively. After adding back the post-1970 average inflation levels of 4.04%, these figures rise to $33,533,809 and $22,140,747.

These differences, although significant, represent the divergence in average returns during times when CAPE ratios have been merely above or below average. As the table above demonstrates, the difference in returns following investments made in very low vs. very high CAPE environments has been far greater.

Explaining the Anomalous “Bump”: Where Behavior Confounds Theory

Although low CAPE levels have been associated with higher future returns, and vice versa, the relationship is far from perfect across different CAPE ranges. Specifically, there is an anomalous “bump” whereby future returns for the 20-25 CAPE range have been nearly as high or higher than those that have followed any other CAPE level.

My best guess is that this peculiarity relates to human psychology and behavior. Historically, when stocks have risen for an extended period following a bear market, investors have been increasingly willing to believe that “it’s different this time” and that the good times will continue indefinitely. At these times, FOMO (fear of missing out), greed, and momentum have taken center stage until valuations reached levels which all but guaranteed a catastrophe.

Greed, Fear, & Where we Stand Today

The above relationships are a powerful representation of investor psychology. Historically, when the crowd’s greed manifests in lofty stock valuations, future returns have tended to be anemic. On the other hand, when widespread skepticism and despondency have caused earnings to go on sale, above average returns have tended to ensue. Alternately stated, investors would be well-served to follow Buffett’s advice to be “fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful.”

Recent market malaise notwithstanding, stocks remain overvalued by historical standards. Taking the most recent data available, the CAPE ratio currently stands at 27.42, which is 30% higher than its historical average since 1970. This CAPE level implies real annualized returns over the next five years of 3.6%, which is approximately 50% lower than the 6.9% average that has prevailed since 1970. Over the next ten years, the implied real rate of return is 4.3% as compared to a historical average of 6.6%.

When the Going Gets Tough, the Tough get Tactical and Seek Dividends

Over five decades spanning January 1970 to December 2019, the two worst periods for the S&P 500 Index were the 1970s and the 2000s. Continue Reading…